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Abstract 
This paper tests the Rational Expectations (RE) hypothesis regarding retirement 
expectations, controlling for sample selection, reporting biases, and unobserved 
heterogeneity. We find that retirement expectations in the Health and Retirement Study 
(HRS) are consistent with the RE hypothesis. We also examine how a wide array of 
factors, such as wealth, income, health insurance, pensions, and health status influence 
retirement expectations formation using panel data from all available waves of the HRS. 
We further analyze how new information affects the evolution of retirement expectations 
and discover that, on average, individuals correctly anticipate most uncertain events when 
planning their retirement, except for some health conditions and economic factors. Our 
results have important implications for a wide variety of models in economics that 
assume rational behavior. 
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1. Introduction 
 
The Health and Retirement Study (HRS) provides us with the rare opportunity to directly analyze the evolution of 
retirement expectations and test the Rational Expectations hypothesis which is without a doubt one of the more 
used and useful hypothesis in economics. Due to its extensive use, it is surprising how widely the definition of the 
term Rational Expectations varies.
1 Our use of the term and the approach to testing the hypothesis will be very close 
to and consistent with the views expressed by the precursors of this powerful assumption. We will essentially 
maintain that agents’ subjective beliefs about the evolution of a set of variables of interest coincide with the 
objectively measurable population probability measure. This is in line with the original characterization of Muth 
(1961) and Lucas (1972).
2 The main difference with this seminal work, however, is that instead of concentrating on 
forecasts of market level variables, we will focus on how individuals form expectations over an array of micro 
variables that affect them directly, or are in part under their control, for instance their retirement age, their health, 
their employment, their wealth, their income, etc. 
It is important to distinguish that while in macroeconomic theory the RE assumption is understood mainly 
as an equilibrium concept,
3 in microeconomic applications the concept is used as a synonym of individual 
rationality or an efficient use of information with regard to individual level variables. The latter implies that 
somehow the economy is in equilibrium. This RE assumption at the micro level underlies a majority of the research 
in applied fields, and it is at the forefront of most work in dynamic models of individual behavior. This is primarily 
because most household and individual level data sources are rich in micro variables and it is the responsibility of 
the researcher to try to control for the macroeconomic environment in which those decisions are made. 
The debate over whether testing rational expectations is a worthwhile enterprise goes back more than two 
decades. Prescott (1977, p.30) expressed a strong opinion, one that Young and Darity (2001) argue he still 
maintains: 
                                                 
1 A similar statement could have been made (and might still be) about the term ‘rationality’, as discussed, for example in 
Schuetz (1943). However, economics has come a long way since then in formalizing our methodological approach to economic 
analysis, with the characterization of rationality playing a central role in that leap. 
2 For a survey of the early contributions see the special issue in the Journal of Money, Credit and Banking edited by McCallum 
(1980). For a more recent discussion see Sargent (1995). 
3 Thanks largely to Lucas’ seminal contributions, where expectations affect the stochastic evolution of the economy and this 
evolution in turn affects expectations formation.  
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“Like utility, expectations are not observed, and surveys cannot be used to test the rational expectations hypothesis. 
One can only test if some theory, whether it incorporates rational expectations, or, for that matter, irrational 
expectations, is or is not consistent with observations.” 
Part of our work in this paper tries to tackle that skepticism, and make the case for retirement expectations 
from the HRS as being a measure of something (Young and Darity 2001, quote Prescott as saying that responses to 
expectations questions should not be treated as measurements of anything), in this case retirement itself.  
Once we make that case we will be ready to go further and follow the mandate from Simon (1979, p.505), 
“It is too early to render final verdict on the rational expectations theory. The issue will ultimately be decided, as 
all scientific debates should be, by a gradual winnowing of the empirical evidence, and that winnowing process has 
just begun.”  
Tobin (1980, p.29), 
“Economists, all of us, should pay more attention to actual data on expectations and how they are formed and less 
to our own assumptions about what they are and how they are or should be formed.” 
And Lovell (1986, p.111), 
“My own view is that the appropriate realm for empirical research should not be demarcated in terms of a 
dichotomy between assumptions and predictions—I think that direct testing of the rational expectations hypothesis 
is an appropriate and worthwhile activity…a theory that is said to be based on micro foundations should survive 
empirical testing at the level of the individual decision making unit.” 
We test the Rational Expectations Hypothesis using data on retirement expectations, and we explore how 
these expectations are influenced by individual and household factors such as wealth, income, health insurance, 
pensions, and health status. We also study how and whether new information affects plans over time. Once we 
confirm rationality, we analyze the role of new information to better understand expectation formation. 
The objective of testing the RE Hypothesis also goes back a couple of decades, as the debate above 
suggests. It begins in the context of the life cycle permanent income hypothesis in a stream of literature that starts 
with the seminal contribution of Hall (1978), and then compares forecasts of market variables with realizations like 
in Figlewski and Watchtel (1981 and 1983), Kimball Dietrich and Joines (1983), de Leeuw and McKelvey (1981 
and 1984), Gramlich (1983), and more recently Davies and Lahiri (1999), and Christiansen (2003). Finally, work  
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by Leonard (1982) analyzes wage expectations of employers, and Fair (1993) analyzes the question in the context 
of large macroeconomic models. In all these cases the concern is with market level variables, and the evidence in 
these and many other studies is mixed. We propose a slightly different approach in line with Bernheim’s (1990) 
work, which we believe is likely to bring back to center stage the debate about whether we should be testing one of 
our key working hypotheses, in particular the RE hypothesis, now that large data sets provide us with the 
opportunity to explore expectations over micro variables in more detail than ever before.
4    
Panel data available through the HRS allow us to observe people’s plans as they approach retirement, and 
allow us to control for unobserved heterogeneity regarding retirement planning by exploiting the longitudinal 
nature of the data. We take advantage of the richness of the information we are using, not only in evaluating factors 
that influence retirement plans over time, but also in analyzing how consistent those plans are and how new 
information influences those plans. We want to understand which factors matter when planning for retirement, 
including how people make use of existing and new information to form and update their expectations. In 
particular, how do people form expectations over uncertain events and how should uncertainty be modeled? 
If our tests reject the Rational Expectations (RE) hypothesis, two very different, but nonetheless connected, 
interpretations are possible.
5 First, we could conclude that models of rational behavior expect too much of 
individuals, forcing us to abandon the “full rationality hypothesis” that economic agents behave “as if” they were 
making a large number of computations implied by the theory. One possible alternative to the fully rational model 
could be an adaptive learning model which introduces a form of bounded rationality, in which individuals use 
standard econometric techniques to make and adjust their forecasts of relevant variables, with RE emerging as an 
equilibrium of this trial and error process (see, for example, Pesaran 1987, and Evans and Honkapohja 2001 for 
illuminating presentations of these type of models). Second, we could conclude that reality is much more complex 
than even most dynamic models assume, with individuals forming expectations (maybe rational ones) not over a 
fixed probability distribution of uncertain events, but over a family of distributions for each source of uncertainty. 
                                                 
4 For example the NLSY79 asked respondents in some survey years their expected number of years of education. Dominitz and 
Manski (1996 and 1997) analyze the use of data on wage expectations by households and young adults in two different 
surveys. 
5 A third, less exciting alternative is that one of the assumptions we are jointly testing along with rationality is rejected. We will 
later make clear the nature of these additional assumptions, which happen to essentially coincide with those also jointly tested 
along with RE by previous researchers.  
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This involves individuals learning over time about the characteristics of these distributions and updating their priors 
as new information comes along.  
The first conclusion would be a set back for research using dynamic modeling since it would put into 
question an attractive and central tool. The second, would mean that we need more realistic dynamic models, which 
are likely to be more complex, but also more attentive to details of the process of expectations formation by 
individuals. In essence the latter would be equivalent to revisiting Muth’s (1961, p. 316) point that “dynamic 
economic models do not assume enough rationality.”  
Finally, if our tests do not reject the rational expectations hypothesis, we can at least continue to rely on 
that rationality, and the strategies used to model it, as a good first approximation to behavior by economic decision 
makers. Furthermore, it would then be reasonable to use some of these variables in modeling complex economic 
situations as van der Klaauw (2000) does. 
We discuss the literature and our contributions in Section 2. The conceptual model and the econometric 
specifications are presented in Section 3. Section 4 provides information about the data used in the empirical 
analysis, and Section 5 reports our main findings. We conclude in Section 6. 
 
2. Background 
Most of the retirement literature, using both reduced form and structural models, focuses on the retirement 
decision or “outcome”, with an emphasis on the role of health, social insurance, and economic status of agents in 
the household. We take a different approach and analyze how people’s retirement expectations evolve over time. 
We examine the importance of financial incentives, health status, and health insurance status on expectations. 
Understanding how these and other factors affect expectations would give us a better sense of the importance of 
these incentives on behavior. 
Comparing Expectations to Outcomes 
Much of the work on expectations of retirement focuses on comparing those expectations against outcomes 
(Bernheim 1988, 1989; Dwyer and Hu 1999; Forni 2002, Dwyer 2002). Deviations are explained by unanticipated 
changes to relevant factors. These types of analyses concentrate on how precise expectations are in terms of their  
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relationship to the outcome and not on how expectations are formed. Only Bernheim (1989) provides tests in the 
tradition of the RE literature, but due to data limitations the results are mixed.  
Bernheim (1988 and 1989) explores the connection between expectations and outcomes and finds that 
although people do not use all the information available to them, they do form rational plans and stick to them. The 
main finding is that people report likely outcomes instead of mean dates given a probability distribution.
6 He uses 
the Retirement History Survey (RHS), which represents a cohort retiring in the seventies.  The data were not as rich 
in their ability to tackle retirement expectations, particularly in health status. 
  More recent work by Dwyer and Hu (1999) and Dwyer (2002) also examines this question in a static life 
cycle framework comparing baseline plans to outcomes.  Dwyer and Hu (1999), using only the first two waves of 
the HRS, find that people who retire early as planned tend to be able to afford to do so and they are more likely to 
have sources other than Social Security benefits to pay for additional leisure. The authors conclude that health is a 
very important predictor of retirement plans, while economic factors become more influential in determining actual 
retirement.
7 Dwyer (2002), also using the HRS, compares baseline expectations (ages 51-61) of retirement to 
outcomes by wave 4 (ages 57-67) when a substantial sub-sample has reached its expected retirement age. She finds 
that the majority of the HRS sample follows through on plans for retirement if you include partial retirement in the 
definition. Health and socio-economic factors, however, still play a role in explaining changes to plans.  
This literature ignores all of the information available between the initial baseline plan and the ultimate 
outcome at the final stage. It is important to account for the adjustment process which occurs in between. In the first 
round of interviews, not everyone has thought about retirement, and we only observe plans for those who have 
which leads to heterogeneity concerns.
8 There is a sample selection problem that is exacerbated by focusing on only 
those who thought about it early on in the process.  In this work we control for this sample selection, and we utilize 
                                                 
6 This is the mode of the distribution. As Bernheim emphasizes this is not a problem as long as the distribution is symmetric 
and singled peak. It should also be the case that the sample average of the reported most likely outcomes coincides with the 
mean of the distribution. 
7 This evidence might indicate that the market incompleteness inherent to the Social Security system (the inability to borrow 
against future benefits) has the effect of making current economic measures poor predictors of future economic variables in 
reduced form models. 
8 Some people report expected ages of retirement even though they admit to not having thought about it much.  A majority of 
those who have not thought about it do not report any expected age.  Many say they will likely 'never' retire if they do report 
something.  Prior work uses any age with no adjustment for the amount of planning that went into it.  That work also uses 
proxies of benefit take-up for expected age if it is missing.  
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the five waves of data and examine how expectations are formed and how new information affects expectations 
over time once we have tested the RE hypothesis. 
  Forni (2002) uses the first two waves of the HRS to examine how financial shocks influence deviations to 
plans.  He uses self-reported financial shocks which are quite noisy and do not perform well in the models. He 
concludes that the data are consistent with Bernheim’s finding that reported expectations measure likely retirement 
outcomes rather than the mean of the expected retirement age distribution. 
Recent work by Coronado and Perozek (2001) examines the effect of unanticipated changes in wealth on 
retirement and finds that households were more likely to retire early if they held more corporate equity immediately 
prior to the 1990s’ bull market.  They introduce uncertainty to financial factors and examine the retirement 
outcome. Hurd and Retti (2001) tackle a similar research question using the self-reported probability of working 
beyond age 62, but find no evidence in changes in this variable with the wealth increases in the stock market in the 
mid to late 1990s. We, too, examine a related question regarding uncertain factors influencing retirement but we 
focus on retirement expectations over time.  Lusardi (1999) focuses on the importance of information costs in the 
retirement decision and savings, which acknowledges uncertainty in a different way from the present project. 
Expectations Formation  
  There has been little work done on expectation formation. Bernheim (1990) focuses on expectations 
formation to test individuals’ rationality.  He cannot reject the hypothesis of strong rationality, meaning that only 
new information affects individual changes of expectations regarding Social Security receiving benefit levels.
9 
We build on Bernheim’s model of expectations formation, and on the tradition of Muth (1961) and the 
rational expectations revolution, to argue that testing whether past retirement expectations are a sufficient statistic 
for current retirement expectations is indeed a test of the RE hypothesis. We use the full longitudinal HRS, and we 
measure retirement expectations differently and with different instruments to deal with endogeneity and reporting 
biases problems. We also use panel data techniques and control for sample selection. 
  Dwyer and Mitchell (1999) study expectation formation using only wave 1 of the HRS.  They incorporate 
health into models of labor supply, while dealing with the potential endogeneity of health.  They use expectations 
                                                 
9 More recently, Dominitz, Manski, and Heinz (2001) using data from the Survey of Economic Expectations have analyzed the 
connection between Social Security Expectations and retirement savings, but do not discuss individual rationality.  
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of retirement as a proxy for retirement.  The assumption is that the expectation is equal to the outcome.  Our 
analysis can be considered a test of their maintained hypothesis.  
Dynamic Models 
  The research discussed so far uses static life cycle models of the retirement decision and applies it to 
planning for retirement to test some level of rationality.  Since we are also interested, however, in pursuing this 
question later in a dynamic framework, we want to test the Rational Expectations hypothesis to understand how to 
appropriately incorporate uncertainty in dynamic models. The rational expectations assumption is a cornerstone of 
most dynamic utility maximization models under uncertainty.  
Recent literature on dynamic modeling has been able to solve rich dynamic life cycle models of retirement, 
allowing for uncertainty over future wages, future investment returns, health outcomes, and even spouse’s 
variables. Dynamic models to date have not focused on expectation formation with respect to the variables 
considered stochastic.  Models to date usually assume the variables follow a certain distribution, which is then 
integrated out using numerical or mathematical methods.  We propose to take a closer look at how expectations 
over uncertain outcomes are formed, and how they influence current decisions. If we are unaware of how these 
expectations are formed, and whether they are realized, we might be missing an important dimension of the 
decision making process by rational agents, potentially leading to less efficient policy recommendations. In this 
work, we test the Rational Expectations hypothesis before assuming it in the next stage of this and future research. 
Rejecting the RE hypothesis might cast serious doubts on a key assumption of dynamic models, maybe suggesting 
that either simpler models of individual behavior are to be used, or on the contrary, more realistic dynamic models 
that account for learning about the probability distributions of future events might be worth considering.  
  Our results have important implications for the growing literature on dynamic modeling, and models that 
rely on some form of a rationality assumption to solve for, simulate, and eventually estimate the parameters of an 
economic model of behavior.   
  8 





t X E X Ω =    (1) 
where the variable X, retirement age, is forecasted, the full information set at time t is represented by Ωt, and E is 
the expectations operator. This is the most commonly used representation of the Rational Expectations hypothesis, 
where we take as the rational expectation of a variable its conditional mathematical expectation (see for example 
Sargent and Wallace 1976). This guarantees that errors in expectations will be uncorrelated with the set of variables 
known at time t. 
  Variables included in the vector representing the information set Ω, come from standard life cycle models 
of retirement behavior (see Lumsdaine and Mitchell 1999 for a survey).  It is well established that the factors that 
influence retirement include, for example, health, health insurance, and socio-economic status. Our first efforts 
focus on examining the role of these factors on retirement expectations. A logical hypothesis at this point is that the 
factors that influence retirement also influence retirement expectations in a similar way.     
Using the law of iterated expectations and assuming that the new information was correctly forecasted by 
agents, from equation (1) we get: 
, ] | , [ 1 1
e
t t t t t t
e
t X X E X E E X E = Ω = Ω Ω = Ω + + ω    (2) 
where ωt+1 represents information that comes available between periods t and t+1. Notice that it is essential here to 
assume that new information (its conditional distribution, not just its mean) is correctly forecasted. Without this 
additional assumption expression (2) would not be correct. We are going to test this assumption jointly with the 
more standard RE hypothesis, once we also assume linearity of the process presented in (2). Notice that the 
assumption of correct forecasting is in essence no different from the assumption in the early RE literature; namely 
that forecast errors are normally distributed with mean zero, in a specification that regresses outcomes of a 
particular market variable on its expectations and a constant.  
Then from (2) we can write the evolution of expectations through time as 




t X X η    (3)  
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where  




t t X E X Ω − = + + + η        
 
and therefore E(ηt+1|Ωt)=0.  Notice that ηt+1 is a function of the new information received since period t, ωt+1, 
From this characterization of the evolution of expectations, as in Bernheim (1990), we can test the Rational 
Expectations (RE) hypothesis with the following regression: 




i t X X , , , , 1 ε γ β α + Ω + + = + ,   (4) 
where α is a constant, and γ is a vector of parameters that estimate the effect of information in period t on period’s 
t+1 expectations. The RE hypothesis implies that α=γ=0, and β=1. A weak RE test, in the terminology of Lovell 
(1986) and Bernheim (1990), assumes that γ is equal to a vector of zeros, and tests for α=0 and β=1––in other 
words it tests whether expectations follow a random walk. The strong RE test is less restrictive and also tests for 
γ=0.  Bernheim (1990) cannot reject these hypotheses in a model where agents are forming expectations regarding 
the level of Social Security benefits they will receive, once he controls for measurement error in the self-reports 
using instrumental variables.
10 In the next sections we will test these hypotheses exploiting the longitudinal nature 
of the HRS, while controlling for measurement error and sample selection.
11 
We are also interested in the role of new information in expectations formation. We want to know whether 
new information affects the evolution of expectations, and whether this new information is to some degree 
anticipated.  
Even assuming we cannot reject the prediction of the RE hypothesis, that in (4) β=1, a characterization of 
the role of new information in the evolution of retirement expectations implies that individuals integrate old and 
new information when updating their expectations, attaching weights to each of these sources. Assuming the 
linearity of the function that individuals use to process information regarding the variables of interest, and further 
assuming that the elements of the information set Ω are jointly normally distributed we can then write  
                                                 
10 He uses other expectations as instruments, like expected retirement age, that may be equally plagued with measurement 
error.  He does not test the instruments as we do. We will discuss our instruments and tests in the results section. The possible 
major role of measurement error in RE tests was already emphasized by Lovell (1986).  
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i t E X X Ω − + = + + + ω ω γ ,   (5) 
where the term in parenthesis is the difference between the observed new information and the expectation 
individuals had of this information as of last period. If we had all these elements we could then estimate (5) and 
would expect a coefficient of one in front of the retirement expectation as of time t, and the coefficients in γ could 
be interpreted as the effect on changes in expectation of the unanticipated components of new information.
12 
However, we do not observe the second element in the brackets, and although it could be estimated by making 
further assumptions about the relationship between new and current information, this is likely to be a very noisy 
procedure. Instead, we estimate the following equation   




i t X X , , 1 , 1 ε ω γ β α + + + = + + ,   (6) 
where there is no reason to believe that β would be equal to 1, since the unobserved expectation term from (5) 
would enter into the error term, leading to possible biases in the coefficients of interest, which in part can be treated 
as a problem of measurement error and attenuated using IV techniques. Also, the estimates of the vector γ, are 
interpreted as the effects that changes in specific factors in Ω have on expectation formation. A nonzero coefficient 
on a given change in a member of the information set can be interpreted as information not perfectly anticipated, 
and therefore not embedded in period’s t expectations. 
Econometric Specifications 
Before we can give empirical content to the model above we are faced with a number of issues that need to 
be discussed. First, we need to appropriately control for observed heterogeneity. This is not trivial when we 
consider omitted variables as well as potential reporting biases.  How to incorporate relevant factors that are 
imperfectly observed has its own set of issues. In addition, respondents make decisions based on many factors that 
may not be observable to the econometrician.  Given these measurement error and omitted variable bias issues, 
unobserved heterogeneity becomes a concern. We want to take into account the unobserved heterogeneity 
potentially present in our characterization of the econometric model.  If we do not control for the unobserved 
                                                                                                                                                                            
11 Rosen (1990) in his commentary on Bernheim's work acknowledges the potential for selection bias in responses to survey 
questions about expectations. He also emphasizes the importance of revisiting the issue of rational planning with newer and 
better data. 
12 Depending on the covariance structure of model used by individuals to process information, these coefficients could be time 
dependent. This could potentially affect the strategy to estimate these coefficients. In the sequel we will assume they are time 
invariant. We thank Tom Muench for helping us understand this point.  
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components we will be confounding partial and total effects of our variables of interest.  Panel data sets allow us to 
model explicitly how those unobserved components enter the econometric specification, and we can choose to 
include them as a fixed effect or as a random variable, and test the different specifications.
13   
Related to this is sample selection.  Not only do people differ in their far-sightedness, but also in their ability to 
process information. For this reason we need to control for sample selection as well.  It is not very difficult to 
control for sample selection in cross-sections, but it becomes a more complex problem in panel data models with 
attrition, and the unbalanced nature of the panels begins to be an issue.  In this paper we follow the work of Hsiao 
(1986) and the recommendations in Wooldridge (2002) to account for selection in our unbalanced panel. 
Sample selection can be depicted in the following schematic model of retirement expectations that controls for 
individual clustering (see Deaton 1997):  
i t i t
e
ti X 1 , 1 , 1 1 ε γ α + Ω + = ,   (7) 
and 
i i i Y 2 2 2 2 ε γ α + Ω + = ,   (8) 
where the set of individual characteristics, Ω1i consists of various socio-economic and demographic variables, and 
other variables we will describe below, and 
e
ti X  represents the expected retirement age at time t. Yi is an indicator 
of whether or not any thought has been given to the retirement plans and determines whether or not we observe
e
ti X , 
and ε1i and ε2i are not necessarily independent. This means that the selection rule is potentially not independent of 
the behavioral function being estimated. It is fairly straightforward to estimate the full model by Maximum 
Likelihood or by standard two-step procedures.  
The HRS provides us with repeated observations of the same individuals.  This allows us to control for 
potential unobserved components that could enter our econometric model. In part it reduces the omitted variable 
                                                 
13 For an interesting discussion of these econometric concerns see Wooldridge (2002), Hsiao (1986), Vella and Verbeek 
(1999), Vella (1998), and Kyriazidou (1997).  
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biases present by the fact that the econometrician cannot observe the whole array of variables that affect individual 
decision making.
14 Then we can write (7) as: 
ti i ti ti u c X + + Ω + = γ α ,   (9) 
where ci represents the unobserved heterogeneity component, and uti are the idiosyncratic disturbances. We can 
estimate this model assuming either no correlation between the observed explanatory variables and the unobserved 
component (random effects), or allowing for arbitrary correlation between the unobserved effect and the observed 
explanatory variables (fixed effects).  We can then test whether the random effects specification or the fixed effect 
specification is more appropriate, and whether the former is more valid than the pooled OLS regression. 
Then we have to take into account selection and attrition bias in the panel model as well.  We combine the 
specifications in (7) to (9) to include the unobserved component as well as the sample selection correction 
following Hsiao (1986) and Wooldridge (2002), where we essentially extend Heckman’s (1979) strategy to correct 
for sample selection to a panel data model, but where in the first stage we estimate a pooled-probit of whether 
individuals have thought about retirement, controlling for individual clustering, and use it as the selection criteria 
into equation (9). 
Another issue we will be concerned with is the potential endogeneity of our regressor of interest, the previous 
period retirement expectation, in the presence of a classical selection problem.
15 Again here we follow Wooldridge 
(2002) to consistently estimate the effect of previous expectation on current expectation, and from (4) we can write 




i t Z X X 1 , 1 , 1 , 1 , 1 ε γ β α + + + = + ,    (10) 
i t i t
e
i t Z X 2 , 2 , 2 2 , ε γ α + + = ,       ( 1 1 )  
and 
i i t i Z Y 3 3 , 3 3 ε γ α + + = ,       ( 1 2 )  
where we first estimate the selection equation (12) using a probit specification, where Yi is equal to one if both the 
expectation in period t and the expectation in period t+1 are observed. Z3 in equation (12) includes all the 
                                                 
14 Given our econometric specifications, we cannot control for the unobserved components that vary over time. However, it is 
not unreasonable to assume that some of these components would bias the coefficients of interest, γ, upwards while others 
would bias them downwards, leading to attenuation of the biases. 
15 We are concerned about reporting errors that may be correlated with measurement errors in other factors.  
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exogenous variables, and any exclusion restriction of the selection equation with respect to the structural equation 
(10). We then consistently estimate (10) by performing a modified 2SLS procedure, where the first stage includes 
as instruments all the exogenous variables used in (12), the Inverse Mills’ ratio from the probit equation, and any 
additional instruments, the validity of which will be tested. 
 
4. Data 
The HRS is a nationally representative longitudinal survey of 7,700 households headed by an individual aged 
51 to 61 as of the first round of interviews in 1992-93. So far five waves of data are available, and we use all of 
them in our analysis. The primary purpose of the HRS is to study the labor force transitions between work and 
retirement with particular emphasis on sources of retirement income and health care needs.  It is a survey conducted 
by the Survey Research Center (SRC) at the University of Michigan and funded by the National Institute on Aging.  
The data for the respondents are merged from wave 5 backwards to waves 4, 3, 2, and 1, and we construct a set of 
consistent variables on different sources of income, financial and non-financial wealth, health, health insurance, and 
socio-economic characteristics that will be assigned to each decision maker appropriately.   
We include any observation for respondents that are working, full time or part time, in any wave and non-
employed (but searching for jobs) that report retirement plans. We exclude respondents who do not report 
retirement plans for more than two consecutive years and for whom we observe relevant information, which results 
in more than 11,000 respondents in the sample and around 24,000 person-period observations once missing values 
in the main variables of interest are considered. We construct relevant dependent and independent variables for 
each wave. We also construct a transitions dataset that consists of changes to these covariates across waves, since 
for part of the analysis we are interested in changes of variables over time.
16 
In each wave respondents are asked when they plan to fully or partially depart from the labor force.
17 They are 
also asked if they thought much about retirement. These questions are not mutually exclusive, but most of the 
people who have not thought about retirement do not report an expected age.
18 A non-trivial number of individuals 
report they will never retire, although these same people often change their minds at some point and report an age.  
                                                 
16 If there are missing values for one wave we use the prior wave of information, but we only go back one wave. 
17 In wave 1 they were only asked about a full departure.  
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The analysis could potentially be sensitive to how we treat "never retire" since we need to put in some older age 
that we select arbitrarily.  We report results for two alternatives.  First, we assign an age of 77 for those who never 
retire (estimated longevity). We call this the full model.  Next, we omit them from the analysis, but correct for the 
selection into this group.
19 
Expected retirement ages are distributed similarly to actual retirement ages with peaks at ages 62 and 65 as well 
as a peak for the bunching at 77 for those who never plan to retire.  Over time these expectations converge to 
between 62 and 65 with fewer people maintaining plans of retirement before age 62 or after age 65. Table 1a and 
1b provide an analysis of how these expectations compare with a number of retirement measures (see also for 
example Panis 2002). Interestingly, expectations are much more concentrated on the traditional peaks than actual 
retirement which, except for a measure that uses the age at which individuals start to receive Social Security, is 
much smoother. In any case, besides the apparent focal points that ages 62 and 65 play when people form 
expectations, it seems clear that retirement expectations are measuring retirement itself. This is encouraging 
evidence if we are to use this data to further characterize the process of how these expectations are formed. 
As indicators of economic status, we construct variables of net worth and household wealth.  We also control 
for income for the respondent. We use health limitations, self-ratings, as well as a number of disease indicators and 
activities of daily living to control for health status.  We also use the self-reported probability of living to age 85 as 
a measure of the individual's time horizon, which may be correlated with health status. Hurd and McGarry (1995) 
find this variable to be highly correlated with own health status and parent mortality. 
Table 2 displays descriptive statistics on the pooled sample.  It is broken up into three tables.  The first two 
tables show levels by sample type and selection criteria.  The next table reports transitions by sample type. For the 
transition data each observation represents transitions between two of the five waves so that each individual has up 
to four observations.  73% of our sample has information for all four transition periods and 84% have it for three.   
Beginning with Table 2a, we see that removing those who report that they will never retire––around 5% of the 
full sample––reduces the average expected retirement age from 64.6 to 62.3.  This is to be expected since those 
who were removed are assigned a value of 77.  Other than this definitional difference, there are relatively few 
                                                                                                                                                                            
18 Many of them report that they will never retire.  If they have not given it any thought, and they say they will never retire, we 
treat their expected retirement age as missing.  If they give a retirement age we treat them as non-missing. 
19 Using age 77 creates a larger variance in the mean of this estimate, which affects the constant in the regressions.  
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significant differences between the two samples.  Earnings of those who plan to never retire are slightly lower, and 
so is their net wealth, but they are much more likely to be self-employed and not to have health insurance.  Also, 
they are more likely to be male, less likely to be married, and have longer expected time horizons. 
Table 2b compares by the selection criteria; whether or not retirement is thought about for the full sample. 
Roughly 47% of the sample gave retirement some thought.  Those who have not thought about retirement are less 
likely to be employed during the panel, and are financially worse off.  They are also more likely to receive 
government health insurance. Moreover, they report to be in worse overall general health by subjective and 
objective measures, and are more likely to be female and less educated. 
Looking at the transitions of this data in Table 2c, on average people are postponing retirement since the 
average deviation in expected retirement age is positive. The frequency of change is only slightly higher for the full 
sample compared with the restricted sample. Plans do change around 55% of the time in the full sample. This is 
especially true among those that at some point thought they would never retire. This sub-sample is very likely to 
actually report an expected age in subsequent waves. There are smaller changes in earnings and wealth among 
those who never plan to retire, but more of them become uninsured. Those, that over time think they will never 
retire, are faced with much smaller changes in the covariates. This is not unexpected since they are a select sample. 
 
5. Empirical Results 
Analysis of Expectations Formation 
The first part of the analysis examines factors that influence how people form retirement expectations. As we 
mentioned above, this is the first paper to study this question using panel data and focusing on the expectation 
formation with controls for unobserved heterogeneity and sample selection.  Table 3a reports pooled OLS, and 
fixed and random effects results with no sample selection controls for the full sample.  Using Hausman’s 
specification test we can reject the random effects model over the fixed effects (we can reject the hypothesis that 
the coefficients are equal). However, this is not very surprising since many of the variables of interest vary very 
little creating instability in the parameters of the fixed effect specification. Using a Lagrange Multiplier (Breusch-
Pagan) test we find that the random effects specification is preferred to the pooled OLS.  We find that people with 
higher net worth and higher earnings plan to retire earlier probably because they can afford to.  Those with private  
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health insurance expect to retire later than those with access to employer provided coverage or retiree coverage, and 
self-employed individuals plan to retire much later. 
It is interesting to note that those with arthritis plan to retire earlier, but most other health factors, surprisingly, 
are not significant, although this is something that the selection correction will clarify. As individuals grow older 
they tend to lean toward retiring earlier, as do married people. Males and whites are more likely to expect to retire 
later. 
Controlling for sample selection is key, and changes the results considerably. This is not surprising given the 
considerable differences in a number of factors whereby people have given thought to retirement or not. We see in 
table 3b, that after controlling for the selection into thinking about retirement, the effect of earnings is of the 
opposite sign. So people who earn more are now more likely to plan to work longer (higher opportunity cost, larger 
substitution effect). Also, the private health insurance effect becomes stronger in the Pooled Corrected OLS but 
insignificant in the Random Effects model. Interestingly, after we correct for selection, the main health indicators 
are now significant, with bad health indicators or health limitations making the person more likely to plan to retire 
earlier, with the exception of having difficulty with climbing stairs, which still lead to plans for later retirement. 
After controlling for sample selection, we find that more educated individuals plan to retire later. The effect of 
age is no longer significant, but the time trends, proxied by wave indicators, show that those reporting expected 
retirement ages during the bull market of the late 1990s are more likely to expect to retire earlier, a result consistent 
with the conclusions of Coronado and Perozek (2001). By the sign, size, and high significance of the selection 
correction term, we can conclude that people with a higher propensity to have thought about retirement, retire later. 
Table A.1. in the Appendix shows the determinants of the selection criteria using both cross-section and panel 
data techniques. We observe a good fit for these two models. Also in the Appendix, Table A.2. reports the selection 
corrected results for the restricted sample.  Removing those who report that they will never retire changes some of 
the estimated magnitudes. Mainly economic factors (including education) become more important when we remove 
the ‘nevers’, but the collinear self-employment effect goes away, since ‘nevers’ are more likely to be self-
employed. The effect of marital status, which may be an indicator of employer-provided benefits through the 
spouse, becomes insignificant without the ‘nevers’. Clearly, the individuals that do not plan to retire are an 
important source of variation to understand how people plan for retirement. While the analysis is sensitive to how  
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we deal with the ‘nevers’, we believe that they belong in the sample. By excluding them we would remove a select 
part of the expected retirement age distribution, thereby biasing our results upward. In other words, we would be 
keeping those more likely to postpone retirement and omitting those more likely to expedite it. Relying on sample 
selection to deal with observable differences results in a loss of information.
20 
Tests of Rational Expectations 
Table 4 reports the weak and strong RE tests for the full sample.  The data support the weak and strong RE 
hypotheses only in an augmented model that corrects for sample selection and measurement error in the report of 
expected retirement age, resulting in a selection corrected IV specification.
21 
Notice that we perform an F-test based on the null hypothesis that β=1 in equation (4), to test the RE 
hypothesis. We obtain coefficients for beta of 1.027 for the weaker test, which given the precision of the estimate 
cannot reject the hypothesis that expectations follow a random walk. For the pooled OLS estimation the weak test is 
effectively a unit root test, and as such, and following the literature on testing unit roots in panel data surveyed by 
Bond, Nauges, and Windmeijer (2002), we have to perform a correction to obtain the appropriate critical value. 
However, this matters very little since the unit root hypothesis is soundly rejected.  
For the strong test we estimate the model of equations (10) to (12), using the Corrected IV procedure. The 
beta parameter is estimated to be equal to 1.00681, which clearly fails to reject the RE hypothesis. Notice the 
importance of both instrumenting the previous period’s expectations, and controlling for sample selection. We also 
report in the table tests that show that we cannot reject that we have robust instruments and that the 
overidentification in the 2SLS is correct.
22 In fact the reported results are the product of robustly estimating the 
system of equations via GMM, which provides robustness against unknown forms of heterokedasticity.   
                                                 
20 Although, the analysis is somewhat sensitive to the assigned age for ‘nevers’, sensitivity analysis reveals that the results are 
not significantly different. 
21 The findings are robust across many specifications and empirical techniques including panel data methods.  Much of the 
individual component is explained by time-invarying variables (there is no remaining individual component in a random effects 
model if we exclude these covariates).  The justification for including these time-invarying components in the test is because 
they may be correlated with other time-varying unobservables. However, due to collinearity problems it was necessary to 
remove age from the list of covariates in the second stage of the Corrected IV procedure. As Vella (1998) discusses, this might 
be due to the fact that age in our sample has a fairly small range, leading to the apparent linearity of the inverse Mills’ ratio. 
We are therefore assuming that age is a proxy for the information set, and only matters in terms of making you more or less 
likely to think about retirement, but does not directly affect the expected retirement age. 
22 For a discussion of how to test the robustness of instruments and the overidentifying restrictions see Bound, Jaeger, and 
Baker (1995), Staiger and Stock(1997), Stock, Wright, and Yogo (2002), and Baum, Schaffer and Stillman (2002).  
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The strong test includes information available at time t that should not be significant after controlling for 
time  t expectations. Significance would imply that this factor was not incorporated in the previous period’s 
expectations and implies underutilized information.  After controlling for sample selection and measurement error 
we find that most of these factors are no longer significant, in fact only wealth and being male are. The joint 
hypothesis that all the coefficients are equal to zero cannot be rejected at any traditional level of significance.
23 
The objective behind instrumental variables estimation here is to correct for potential measurement error in 
the reported expected age of retirement at time t. Since people are reporting expectations over uncertain events, we 
expect some degree of reporting error that may be correlated with unobserved factors.  In fact, Bernheim (1988) 
finds that expectations are reported with noise, and our Table 1a and 1b seem to support that theory as well.  Like 
Bernheim (1990), we correct for this problem using instrumental variables analysis.  The instruments must be 
correlated with the expected retirement age but not with the error term or any new information relevant to the t+1 
expectation.  We use time t subjective survival to age 85 probabilities and an indicator of smoking behavior as 
instruments for expected retirement age. In the selection corrected IV, the inverse Mills’ ratio is a third instrument, 
along with the rest of the exogenous variables from the selection equation, as suggested by Wooldridge (2002).
24 
The strongest specification is indeed the selection corrected IV on the full sample.
25 Interestingly, this Corrected IV 
technique seems to circumvent one of the traditional drawbacks of instrumental variables estimation, and that is the 
large increase in standard errors in the estimates of the instrumented variables. In Table 4 we can observe that when 
we move from the OLS estimation to the IV estimation standard errors are multiplied by a factor of 8, but once we 
use the Corrected IV technique they only treble with respect to OLS while the coefficient of interest more than 
doubles. The importance of the selection correction in this setting, contrasts with the results by Bernheim (1990) 
where selection was not important, and the inability to reject rationality was in part the product of large standard 
errors. 
                                                 
23 It is true, however, as in Bernheim (1990) that this is trivially the case if individuals never adjust their expectations. But 
plenty of adjustment goes on in the data, and it seems implausible that all can be blamed on measurement error. 
24 The exclusion restrictions in the selection equation include indicators for whether the father and mother of the respondent 
reached retirement age. 
25 Notice that in columns two and three of Table 4, and in Table A.4. we do not report the adjusted R
2 measure of fit. This is 
common practice, but it is rarely mentioned in empirical work. These types of measures do not have independent significance 
in structural estimation à la IV, given that we are after estimating population parameters, which we consider invariant to the 
particular way of identifying the parameters (instruments), not after minimizing a particular prediction problem. See Ruud 
(2000, p. 515-516 for a discussion)   
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Table A.3.1. and A.3.2. in the Appendix provide the results for the first stage of the IV specifications for 
the weak and strong tests respectively, and Table A.4. presents the results for the IV and Corrected IV 
specifications for the restricted sample. For this sample we cannot reject the RE hypothesis when we control for 
measurement error, due to the large standard errors but we narrowly can when we use the Corrected IV procedure. 
This rejection, and the fact that the coefficient of interest is estimated to be larger than 1, is expected since we are 
removing the upper tail of the distribution of expected retirement ages and are left with a sub-sample that is more 
likely to postpone their retirement plans. 
The Role of New Information 
  In this part of our analysis we are interested in the role of new information, since the prior period, on 
expected retirement age. We examine the effects of changes to all of the relevant factors on plans by estimating 
equation (6) but correcting for sample selection bias and measurement error, following the same strategy as in 
equations (10) to (12).  We hypothesize that there will be no significant effects if, on average, people are able to 
completely anticipate the new information. Notice, however, that a significant coefficient on any covariate does not 
indicate surprise, since it is easy to write an example where even if individuals perfectly know the distribution over 
the uncertain event, once this happens, the estimated coefficient would be positive. A positive coefficient can be 
interpreted to mean that the individual could have known the probabilities, but not what will happen. Table 5 
reports results for the full sample, and in Table A.5. in the Appendix we provide the results for the restricted 
sample. 
The findings are significant and deserve our attention. When we estimate equation (6) and correct for 
selection bias and measurement error in order to attenuate the biases resulting from the fact that we do not have all 
the information of the structural model in (5), we find that the coefficient on the expected retirement age reported in 
the previous period is not significantly different from 1, suggesting that we have greatly reduced the biases, and 
increased the reliability of the estimated coefficients.
26 The only factors that significantly alter retirement plans are 
some health conditions and the availability of pensions and private health insurance. Focusing on the selection 
corrected IV specification, individuals who have been newly diagnosed with diabetes or high blood pressure expect 
                                                 
26 The error term seems to be more correlated with the expected retirement age as of time t than the new information set, since 
the estimated effects (γ) are not significantly different after correcting for measurement error but β was biased downward 
without the measurement error correction.  
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to delay retirement, maybe because they have to slow down and therefore need to work more years to reach the 
same level of well being, or because their new diagnoses reduces the uncertainty about their future health status and 
allows them to plan with a longer time horizon. Changes to economic status have no effect, except for those 
individuals who now have access to a pension through their employer. New pension availability probably proxy for 
people returning to the labor force, which correlates with expecting to retire later. New private health insurance 
could proxy for moving into self-employment.  
Table A.5. in the Appendix provides the IV selection corrected results for the restricted sample, which 
presents a very similar picture, with the added results that individuals who have been diagnosed with a stroke since 
the last wave (last two years) and survive, are expecting to retire earlier by about a year, and those that got married 
are now expecting to retire earlier, maybe due to access to more resources through the new spouse. 
We conclude from these results that researchers need to pay special attention to incorporating the 
uncertainty of health shocks, and certain economic variables like health insurance, in dynamic models, or models 
that assume rational expectations. This is something the research community has been relatively aware of for some 
time, but that requires considerable modeling efforts.  
 
6. Conclusions and Future Research 
There are three main areas where this research makes its contributions.  First, we examine factors that influence 
expectation formation using panel data econometric techniques to control for potential sample selection bias and 
unobserved heterogeneity. We learn that unobserved heterogeneity helps to better explain the variation in 
expectation formation and that people who have thought about retirement are selectively different in factors that 
influence retirement.  The findings are consistent with prior work on retirement behavior as well as cross sectional 
work on expectation formation.  Health and socio-economic factors are the factors that influence the formation of 
expectations, with health explaining more of the variation. 
Second, we test the Rational Expectations hypothesis in the formation of expectations for retirement. We 
perform various types of tests and cannot reject the RE hypothesis after controlling for reporting errors and sample 
selection. This has important implications for a wide variety of models that use this assumption, and for dynamic 
models that are often identified under rational expectations assumptions.  
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Finally, we examine the role of new information in retirement expectation formation. This time we focus on 
how well people anticipate changes over factors relevant to the retirement decision. If we can incorporate 
uncertainty in a way such that changes to the information set can be modeled following a known distribution the 
dynamic model is more clearly identified. A model of perfect foresight is rejected with respect to health variables 
and some economic variables, so on average not all changes are anticipated. We find that some components of 
health that are associated with various health conditions warrant extra attention in dynamic models or models that 
assume some type of rationality, if we seek to better fit the data.  
The results in this analysis are meant to foster further discussion and research on the issues surrounding the role 
of expectations in economic modeling. We have provided and tested a methodology, building upon the long RE 
tradition, which allows researchers to use the ever increasing set of data sources that provide expectations variables. 
The econometric work motivates a more structural approach to examining transitions to health states and their 
effects on plans.  We are working on a preliminary dynamic model that incorporates health uncertainties and plan to 
estimate that model incorporating a health transition model as well as introducing uncertainty to other factors. This 
is all part of a broader research agenda where we aim to simulate Social Security reform proposals (in the form of 
changes to benefits) as well as examine the implications of these reforms for savings behavior. Future work will 
also examine joint expectation formation, and their relationship with joint retirement decisions.
27 
                                                 
27 We have done most of the analysis in this paper on married couples, assuming that the spouse's information is exogenous to 
the individual utility maximization problem. We do find that spouse's information is significant in a model of expectations 
formation, and therefore it makes sense to expand the model to allow for joint expectation formation. On the other hand, 
changes to spouse’s variables seem to be well anticipated.  
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Table 1.a. Distribution of Retirement Expectations and Actual Retirement. Full Sample 
 
































































































































#  Obs.  3,708 3,256 2,808 2,230 1,753  5,346  3,967  4,902  6,404 
W1 to W5: the expected retirement age reported in the respective rounds of data. 
Self-R Ret.: reported retirement age when individuals are asked about their employment status. 
Social Sec.: age at which they started to receive Social Security benefits. 
Fully Retired: answer to a direct question regarding when did they fully withdrawn from the labor force. 




Table 1.b. Distribution of Retirement Expectations and Actual Retirement. Restricted Sample 
 






















































































































#  Obs.  3,374 2.740 2,328 1.901 1,449  5,346  3,967  4,902  6,404 
W1 to W5: the expected retirement age reported in the respective rounds of data. 
Self-R Ret.: reported retirement age when individuals are asked about their employment status. 
Social Sec.: age at which they started to receive Social Security benefits. 
Fully Retired: answer to a direct question regarding when did they fully withdrawn from the labor force. 
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Table 2a.  Summary Statistics. Variables in levels 
 






Retirement Plans and Outcomes 
   Expected retirement age 
   Employee  
   Self employed 
   Financially Knowledgeable 
    
Economic factors 
   Net worth (in $100,000) 
   Housing wealth (in $100,000) 
   Respondent’ Income (in $1,000) 
   Has a private pension 
   
Health Insurance 
   Employer provided 
         Retiree 
   Government 
   Private 
   No health insurance 
 
Health factors 
   Health limitation 
   Good-Very Good-Excellent Health 
   Doctor visits 
   Probability of living to age 85 
   High blood pressure 
   Diabetes 
   Arthritis  
   Difficulty walking multiple blocks 
   Difficulty climbing stairs 
   Stroke  
   Heart problems  
   Cancer  
   Smoke
 
    
Demographic factors 
   Age  
   Male 
   Married 
   Bachelor’s degree 
   Professional degree 
   Mother reached retirement age 
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Table 2b.  Summary Statistics by Sample Selection. Full Sample in levels 
 
Variables Thought  About 
N=11,062 
Not Thought  
N= 12,607 
Retirement Plans and Outcomes 
   Expected retirement age 
   Employee  
   Self employed 
   Financially Knowledgeable 
 
Economic factors 
   Net worth (in $100,000) 
   Housing wealth (in $100,000) 
   Respondent’s Income (in $1,000) 
   Has a private pension  
 
Health Insurance 
   Employer Provided 
         Retiree 
   Government 
   Private 
   No health insurance 
 
Health factors 
   Health limitation 
   Good-Very Good-Excellent Health 
   Doctor visits 
   Probability of living to age 85 
   High blood pressure 
   Diabetes 
   Arthritis  
   Difficulty walking multiple blocks 
   Difficulty climbing stairs 
   Stroke  
   Heart Problems  
   Cancer  
   Smoke
 
    
Demographic factors 
   Age  
   Male 
   Married 
   Bachelor’s degree 
   Professional degree 
   Mother reached retirement age 
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Table 2c.  Summary Statistics. Variables in changes 
 






Retirement Plans and Outcomes 
  Changes in Expected Retirement Age 
  Frequency of change 
 
Economic factors 
  Changes in Net Worth (in $100,000) 
  Changes in Income (in $1,000) 
  Private pension transitions 
 
Health Insurance 
  Changes in Private Health Insurance 
  Changes in No Health Insurance   
 
Health factors 
   Health limitation transitions
28 
   Good-V. Gd.-Ex. Health transitions
29 
   Stroke transitions
30 
   Heart Problems transitions 
   Cancer transitions
 
   Diabetes transitions 
   High blood pressure transitions
 
   Arthritis transitions 
   Smoking transitions 
     Probability of living to age 85 
   Doctor visits 
   Difficulty climbing stairs 
   Difficulty walking multiple blocks 
     
Demographic factors 



































































































                                                 
28 =1 if new limitation, 0 if no change, and -1 if you got better 
29 negative means health  worsened 
30  positive means condition (Stroke, cancer, high blood pressure) worsened (0 no change, -1 if better) 
31 =1 means new marriage, = 0 no change, =-1 dissolved marriage (widow, divorce…)  
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Table 3a.  Expectations Formation. Full Sample. No Selection Correction 
Coefficient (Standard Error) 
Variables  Pooled OLS  Fixed Effects  Random Effects 
Economic factors  
  Net Worth (in $100,000) 
  Respondent Income (in $1,000) 
  No Health Insurance 
  Private Health Insurance  
  Self-employed 
  Pension 
  Financially Knowledgeable 
 
Health factors 
   Health limitation  
   Good-V.Good-Exc. Health  
   Doctor visits  
   High blood pressure 
 
   Diabetes 
 
     Cancer 
 
     Stroke  
   Heart problems 
 
   Arthritis 
   Difficulty walking multiple blocks 
   Difficulty climbing stairs 
      
Demographic factors 
 Age 
 Age Sq. 
 Male 
 White 
 Bachelor’s Degree 
 Professional Degree 
 Married 
 Wave 1 
 Wave 2 






































































































































Breusch-Pagan Lagrange Multiplier (OLS vs. RE): χ
2(1)=593.11, P-value=0.0000 
Hausman Test Statistic (RE vs. FE): χ
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Economic factors  
  Net Worth (in $100,000) 
  Respondent Income (in $1,000) 
  No Health Insurance 
  Private Health Insurance  
  Self-employed 
  Pension 
  Financially Knowledgeable 
 
Health factors 
   Health limitation  
   Good-V.Good-Exc. Health 
   Doctor visits 
   High blood pressure 
 
   Diabetes 
 
    Cancer 
 
     Stroke  
   Heart problems 
 
   Arthritis 
   Difficulty walking multiple blocks 
   Difficulty climbing stairs 
   
Demographic factors 
 Age 
 Age Sq. 
 Male 
 White 
 Bachelor’s Degree 
 Professional Degree 
 Married 
 Wave 1 
 Wave 2 
 Wave 3 
 Constant 
 




Fraction due to unobserved component 
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Table 4. Tests of Rational Expectations- Full Sample 
 
Variables  Pooled OLS  IV  Corrected IV 
Weak RE Test (H0: Beta=1): 
Constant 
Expected Retirement Aget 
Test of Over-Id Restrictions 
Test of Weak Instruments 
Strong RE Test (H0: Beta =1): 
Constant 
Expected Retirement Aget 
 
Economic factors at time t 
   Net Worth (in $100,000) 
   Respondent Income (in $1,000) 
   No Health Insurance 
   Private Health Insurance 
   Self-employed 
   Pension  
   Financially Knowledgeable 
 
Health factors at time t 
   Health limitation 
   Good-V.Good-Exc. Health 
   Doctor visits 
   High blood pressure 
   Diabetes problems    
   Cancer 
   Stroke 
   Heart Problems 
   Arthritis 
   Difficulty walking multiple blocks 
   Difficulty climbing stairs  
 
    
Demographic factors at time t 
   Age 
   White 
   Male 
   Bachelor’s Degree 
   Professional Degree 
   Married 
   Wave 1-2 




Test of joint Significance of Covariates 
Test of Over-Id Restrictions 
Test of Weak Instruments 
































































































Cannot Rej. P-v=.2347 
Reject P-v=.0000 
Cannot Reject 




































Cannot Rej. P-v=.2645 







  32  
Table 5.  New information and plans for retirement. Full Sample 
 
Variables  Pooled OLS  IV  Corrected IV 
 




Economic Factors  
  Changes in Net Worth (in $100K) 
  Changes in Earnings (in $1,000) 
  Changes in Priv. Health Insurance 
  Changes in No Insurance 
  Changes in Pension 
 
Health Factors 
  Health limitation transitions
32 
  Good-V.Gd-Exc.Hlt. transitions
33 
  Stroke transitions
34 
  Heart problems transitions 
  Cancer transitions
 
  Diabetes transitions 
  High blood pressure transitions
 
  Arthritis transitions 
  Doctor visits 
  Difficulty climbing stairs 
  Difficulty walking multiple blocks 









Test of Over-Id Restrictions 
Test of Weak Instruments 













































































































                                                 
32 =1 if new limitation, 0 if no change, and -1 if you got better 
33 positive means health improved 
34  positive means condition (Stroke, cancer, high blood pressure) worsened (0 no change, -1 if better) 
35 =1 means new marriage, = 0 no change, =-1 dissolved marriage (widow, divorce…)  
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Table A.1.  Selection Equation Results - Probability of Thinking about Retirement 
 
Variables Probit  Marg. 
Effects 
RE Probit  Marginal 
Effects 
Economic Factors 
   Net wealth (in $100,000) 
   Income (in $1,000) 
   No Health Insurance 
   Private Health Insurance 
   Self-Employed 
   Pension 
   Financially Knowledgeable 
 
Health Factors 
   Health limitation 
   Good-V.Good-Exc. Health 
   Doctor visits 
   Probability of living to 85 
   Diff. walking multiple blocks 
   Diff. climbing stairs 
   High blood pressure 
   Diabetes 
   Cancer 
   Stroke 
   Heart problems 
   Arthritis 
    
Demographic Factors 
   Age 
   Age squared 
   Male 
   White 
   Bachelor’s degree 
   Professional degree 
   Married 
   Mother reached retirement age
   Father reached retirement age 
   Wave 1 
   Wave 2 
   Wave 3 
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Economic Factors  
  Net Worth (in $100,000) 
  Respondent Income (in $1,000) 
  No Health Insurance 
  Private Health Insurance  
  Self-employed 
  Pension 
  Financially Knowledgeable 
 
Health Factors 
   Health limitation  
   Good-V.Good-Exc. Health 
   Doctor visits 
   High blood pressure 
 
   Diabetes 
 
     Cancer 
 
     Stroke  
   Heart Problems 
 
   Arthritis 
   Difficulty walking multiple blocks 
   Difficulty climbing stairs 
   
Demographic Factors 
 Age 
 Age Sq. 
 Male 
 White 
 Bachelor’s Degree 
 Professional Degree 
 Married 
 Wave 1 
 Wave 2 
 Wave 3 
 Constant 
 




Fraction due to unobserved component 
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Table A.3.1.  First Stage Results for Weak RE Test using IV. Full Sample 
 
Variables 1
st Stage of IV  1
st Stage of Corrected IV 
Weak RE Test: 
Constant 
Prob. Of Living to 85 
Smoking 
Inverse Mills Ratio 
 
Economic factors at time t 
   Net Worth (in $100,000) 
   Respondent Income (in $1,000) 
   No Health Insurance 
   Private Health Insurance 
   Self-employed 
   Pension 
   Financially Knowledgeable 
 
Health factors at time t 
   Health limitation 
   Good-V.Good-Exc. Health 
   Doctor visits 
   High blood pressure 
   Diabetes    
   Cancer 
   Stroke 
   Heart Problems 
   Arthritis 
   Difficulty walking multiple blocks 
   Difficulty climbing stairs  
 
    
Demographic factors at time t 
   White 
   Male 
   Bachelor’s Degree 
   Professional Degree 
   Married 
   Wave 1-2 




Test of Weak Instruments 
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Table A.3.2.  First Stage Results for Strong RE Test using IV. Full Sample 
 
Variables  1
st Stage of IV  1
st Stage of Corrected IV 
Strong RE Test: 
Constant 
Prob. of living to 85 
Smoking 
Inverse Mills Ratio 
 
Economic factors at time t 
   Net Worth (in $100,000) 
   Respondent Income (in $1,000) 
   No Health Insurance 
   Private Health Insurance 
   Self-employed 
   Pension 
   Financially Knowledgeable 
 
Health factors at time t 
   Health limitation 
   Good-V.Good-Exc. Health  
   Doctor visits 
   High blood pressure 
   Diabetes    
   Cancer 
   Stroke 
   Heart Problems 
   Arthritis 
   Difficulty walking multiple blocks 
   Difficulty climbing stairs  
 
    
Demographic factors at time t 
   Age 
   White 
   Male 
   Bachelor’s Degree 
   Professional Degree 
   Married 
   Wave 1-2 




Test of Weak Instruments 
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Table A.4.  Tests of Rational Expectations. Restricted Sample 
 
Variables IV  Corrected  IV 
Weak RE Test (H0: Beta =1): 
Constant 
Expected Retirement Aget 
Test of Over-Id Restrictions 
Test of Weak Instruments 
Strong RE Test (H0: Beta =1): 
Constant 
Expected Retirement Aget 
 
Economic factors at time t 
   Net Worth (in $100,000) 
   Respondent Income (in $1,000) 
   No Health Insurance 
   Private Health Insurance 
   Self-employed 
   Pension 
   Financially Knowledgeable 
 
Health factors at time t 
   Health limitation 
   Good-V.Good-Exc. Health 
   Doctor visits 
   High blood pressure 
   Diabetes    
   Cancer 
   Stroke 
   Heart Problems 
   Arthritis 
   Difficulty walking multiple blocks 
   Difficulty climbing stairs  
 
    
Demographic factors at time t 
   Age 
   White 
   Male 
   Bachelor’s Degree 
   Professional Degree 
   Married 
   Wave 1-2    
   Wave 2-3 
 
Test of joint Significance of Covariates 
Test of Over-Id Restrictions 
Test of Weak Instruments 




Cannot Rej. P-v=.2499 






































Cannot Rej. P-v=.8768 
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Table A.5.  New information and plans for retirement. Restricted Sample  
 
Variables  Pooled OLS  IV  Corrected IV 
 




Economic Factors  
  Changes in Net Worth (in 100K) 
  Changes in Earnings (in $1,000) 
  Changes in Priv. Health Insurance 
  Changes in No Health Insurance 
  Changes in Pension 
 
Health Factors 
   Health limitation transitions
36 
   G-V.G.-Exc. Health transitions
37 
   Stroke transitions
38 
   Heart Problems transitions 
   Cancer transitions
 
   Diabetes transitions 
   High blood pressure transitions
 
   Arthritis transitions 
     Doctor visits 
   Diff. walking multiple blocks 
   Difficulty climbing stairs 








Test of Over-Id Restrictions 
Test of Weak Instruments 





































































































                                                 
36 =1 if new limitation, 0 if no change, and -1 if you got better 
37 positive means health improved 
38  positive means condition (Stroke, cancer, high blood pressure) worsened (0 no change, -1 if better) 
39 =1 means new marriage, = 0 no change, =-1 dissolved marriage (widow, divorce…) 